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In response to a request by the German energy regulator, on 28 October the European Com-
mission announced its decision setting out the rules for increased utilisation by the Russian 
gas company Gazprom (and possibly other companies) of the onshore leg of the Nord Stream 
gas pipeline, i.e. the OPAL pipeline. This decision raises a series of questions as to its content, 
its publication procedure, the context of its adoption and its potential consequences. These 
doubts are aggravated by the lack of clarity of information regarding both the OPAL pipeline 
itself and the initial rules governing its utilisation (including its exemption from the third party 
access rule – TPA), and the present decision by the European Commission. As a consequence, the 
Commission’s decision is provoking conflicting reactions. On the one hand, it is being received 
(for example by the Polish and the Ukrainian side) as one that enables Gazprom to increase its 
access to the European market, which could compromise the security of gas supplies to Central 
Europe and the transit of gas via Ukraine. On the other hand, it is being interpreted as a decision 
which does not meet the expectations of Gazprom and the OPAL pipeline operator, which so-
ught increased opportunities to book the pipeline’s capacity in the long term. Therefore, it is not 
known if and when the rules concerning the of OPAL as proposed by the EC will be implemented 
and, as a consequence, whether the EC’s decision will put an end to the process of negotiating 
the rules for the German pipeline’s use that has been ongoing for many years. 
The situation so far
In 2009, the European Commission consented 
to the exemption of the transit part of the OPAL 
pipeline’s capacity (i.e. the capacity from Ger-
many to the Czech Republic) from the TPA rule: 
of more than 50% (even up to 100%) of the 
capacity, provided that the 3 bcm per year gas 
release programme by companies with a domi-
nant position on the Czech gas market is imple-
mented1, otherwise it would be 50% exempt. 
Due to the fact that the gas release programme 
1 Cf the European Commission’s decision of 2009: https://
ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/2009_
opal_decision_de.pdf
has never been implemented, up to now OPAL 
has been exempt from TPA to the level of 50% 
and has been used (mainly by Gazprom) below 
its actual capacity – see Appendix 1.
For several years now, Gazprom, supported 
by the German regulator (Bundesnetzagentur, 
BNetzA), has solicited the European Commis-
sion’s consent to fully exempt the OPAL pipeline 
from TPA and to enable long-term booking of 
the pipeline’s full capacity. The apparent lack of 
third parties interest in the pipeline’s spare ca-
pacity was the core argument in this case. The 
EC avoided taking decision on this matter and 
was prolonging the administrative procedure, 
for instance, by postponing deadlines.
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The Commission’s decision, vague 
points, doubts
In May 2016, the BNetzA submitted – pursu-
ant to a four-party agreement concluded by 
Gazprom, Gazpromexport, the OPAL pipeline 
operator and the BNetzA2 – another request 
to the EC for approval of its proposal aimed 
at enabling increased use of OPAL’s capacity. 
The deadline for considering the request was 
31 October 2016 and according to Maroš Šefčo-
vič, Vice-President of the European Commis-
sion for Energy Union, the Commission had 
no solid legal grounds to reject the request3. 
On 28 October, the EC announced its decision 
regarding the rules for OPAL pipeline use: in 
line with its official capacity the EC has con-
ditionally approved the BNetzA’s proposal, 
requesting several changes to its content. Ac-
cording to its press release, the Commission:
2 Agreement of 31 October 2013 („ursprünglicher Vergle-
ichsvertrag”): http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Servi 
ce-Funktionen/Beschlusskammern/1BK-Geschaeftsze-
ichen-Datenbank/BK7-GZ/2008/2008_0001bis0999/2
008_001bis099/BK7-08-009_BKV/Ver%C3%B6ffentli-
chung_Aktuelles_BF.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=5. 
Agreement of 7 July 2009: http://www.bundesnetzagen 
tu r.de / DE / Se r v i ce - Funk t ione n / B e s ch lus sk am -
m e r n / 1B K - G e s c h a e f t s z e i c h e n - D a t e n b a n k /
B K 7- G Z / 20 0 8 / 20 0 8 _ 0 0 01b i s 0 9 9 9 / 20 0 8 _ 0 01b
is099/BK7-08-009_BK V/BK7-08-009_Beschluss_
vom_07072009_bf.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2 
Agreement of 25 February 2009: http://www.bundesnet-
zagentur.de/DE/Service-Funktionen/Beschlusskam-
mern/1BK-Geschaeftszeichen-Datenbank/BK7-GZ/2008/
2008_0001bis0999/2008_001bis099/BK7-08-009_BKV/
BK7-08-009_Beschluss_vom_25022009_bf.pdf?__blob=-
publicationFile&v=6
3 Cf the statement by Maroš Šefčovič regarding OPAL during 
the Tatra Summit in Bratislava on 28 October 2016: https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=N5acXNISQNM (the ques-
tion regarding OPAL – 8:53, Šefčovič’s reply – 15:47)
• has set the level of OPAL’s capacity exemption 
from TPA at 50%; 
• has decided that up to 20% of OPAL’s capacity 
(if there is sufficient demand) is to be made ava-
ilable to third parties on a short-term basis from 
the German Gaspool hub. Gazprom (and other 
companies having a dominant position on the 
Czech market) may bid for this capacity only at 
a specific base price. In the event of documented 
increased demand, the capacity made available to 
third parties may be increased;
• as a consequence, the Commission has enabled 
access to at least 30% of the remaining capacity 
with no additional conditions and/or limitations, 
which means that this portion of the capacity 
may be booked by Gazprom to thereby increase 
its share in OPAL’s capacity to at least 80%;
• has introduced the certification requirement 
as regards the OPAL operator (certification by 
the national regulator and the EC)4.
The changes proposed by the EC are expec-
ted to be in effect until 2033, and they are le-
gally binding on the German regulator which 
should implement them within a month. 
However, this is unlikely. Considering the fact 
that the BNetzA is obliged to consult the new 
rules with the interested companies, the de-
adline for implementing the new regulations 
would most likely need to be postponed for 
several months. Moreover, it is legally possible 
to appeal against the EC’s decision, and for the 
BNetzA to withdraw from the proposed chan-
ges in OPAL utilisation submitted in May 2016 
(instead, the BNetzA could, for example, try to 
devise a new version of the proposal in coope-
ration with the OPAL operator and Gazprom). 
The European Commission has not yet pu-
blished the content of its decision regarding 
the OPAL pipeline in its official documents, and 
its press release raises numerous doubts, for 
instance due to the incomplete nature of the 
information contained therein. Referring to 
4 Gas markets: Commission reinforces market conditions 
in revised exemption decision on OPAL pipeline, Brus-
sels, 28 October 2016, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-re-
lease_IP-16-3562_en.htm
The EC has conditionally approved the 
BnetzA’s proposal regarding OPAL. How-
ever, due to the amendments it has made 
and to the controversy over its decision, it 
is unclear if and when the decision will be 
implemented.
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the request submitted by the German regula-
tor and to its own previous decision (published 
only in German), the EC fails to explicitly state 
whether its present decision covers the pipeli-
ne’s full capacity or merely its ‘transit’ capacity. 
It also does not specify how one differs from 
the other in the situation of increasing integra-
tion of the German and Czech markets. Simi-
larly, it is unclear, for example, what minimum 
OPAL capacity (if any) is to be made available to 
third parties and according to what rules this 
volume could be increased (or decreased).
Similarly, the very procedure in which the EC an-
nounced its decision was controversial. Uncon-
firmed details had been reported by the media 
several days before the decision was announced 
and when it was officially revealed at a press con-
ference, a ban on disseminating this information 
was introduced, lasting for several hours (until 6 
pm on Friday, 28 October 2016). This gave rise to 
suspicions that the EC deliberately tried to halt 
the spread of information and prevent prompt 
reactions to it. Even before its official announce-
ment, the content of the decision was criticised 
by gas companies – Poland’s PGNiG and Ukra-
ine’s Naftohaz. At the same time, it seems that 
the decision does not fully meet the expectations 
of the interested parties, including Gazprom and 
the OPAL operator (see Appendix 2). 
Finally, the coincidence of the EC’s decision 
regarding the OPAL pipeline, which had been 
postponed for many years, with the EU-Russia 
talks over the increasingly likely settlement in 
the EC’s anti-trust proceedings against Gaz-
prom (26 October), and the rumour suggesting 
that Russia has withdrawn from the construc-
tion of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, is causing 
additional doubts. This coincidence prompts, 
for example, a question as to whether there mi-
ght be a more comprehensive gas agreement 
between the EU and Russia. Although this wo-
uld be tantamount to a rather surprising shift 
in the EC’s mode of operation in relations with 
Gazprom to date, the decision regarding the 
OPAL pipeline (if it gets implemented) and the 
possible anti-trust settlement would resolve 
two problematic issues that have plagued EU
-Russia gas relations for years, thereby contri-
buting to an improvement thereof. 
The potential consequences
At present, it is difficult to state if and when the 
rules concerning use of the OPAL pipeline esta-
blished by the EC will be implemented by the Ger-
man regulator (see above) and whether and how 
Gazprom will want to take advantage of them. 
However, it can be stated that the terms set by the 
EC enable Gazprom to apply for at least 10.2 bcm 
more of OPAL capacity. In this way, these terms 
(together with the presently considered option to 
increase the capacity of the Nord Stream pipeline 
by 5 bcm) enable increased supplies of Russian 
gas to the German and Central European markets. 
Increased supplies of Russian gas (at a potentially 
competitive price) via OPAL would:
– contribute to decreased demand for supplies 
via existing alternative routes / sources (for 
example the LNG terminal in Świnoujście) in Cen-
tral Europe and would limit the demand for the 
implementation of new diversification projects; 
– reduce the significance of Ukrainian transit ro-
ute, at the same time boosting the importance 
of Germany and also the Czech Republic in the 
transit of Russian gas; 
– raise questions regarding the likelihood of the 
EU’s goal involving diversification of sources of 
supply being attained.
The greater share of OPAL pipeline capacity ava-
ilable to Gazprom means that Gazprom would 
be able to transport more gas via Nord Stream 
(even more if Nord Stream’s capacity would get 
The possible increase in the supplies of 
Russian gas to and via Germany would limit 
the demand for gas from other sources and, 
as a consequence, hamper the diversifica-
tion of supplies within the EU, including in 
Central Europe.
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increased by an additional 5 bcm as planned). 
This could temporarily reduce Gazprom’s imme-
diate need to build Nord Stream 2 (it would be 
possible to redirect more gas from the route via 
Ukraine and/or to offer increased supplies to the 
European market). At the same time, it is unlikely 
that Gazprom would use this as a key reason to 
abandon the plan to build Nord Stream 2: incre-
ased availability of the OPAL pipeline does not 
satisfy all the goals associated with Nord Stream 
2, and the terms set by the EC may to some de-
gree facilitate its construction as they  clarify the 
rules covering gas transport via Germany.
Alongside this, the terms specified by the EC wo-
uld force Gazprom to take a more active part in 
the market game: to be able to take advantage 
of the option for increased gas transmission via 
OPAL, Gazprom would have to regularly book 
OPAL’s capacity on a short term basis, by which 
it would have to increase its adaptation to the 
rules of the liberalising EU market.
Should capacities made available (according to 
the terms set by the EC) to third parties via the 
German Gaspool hub be utilised, this would fo-
ster greater integration of the  Czech market – 
and potentially the entire Central European mar-
ket – with the German market. In consequence, 
this would increase the role of Germany in the 
regional gas market, whereas it would lower the 
chances for implementation of some of regional 
integration projects in Central Europe (including 
the integration of the V4 gas markets).
The OPAL pipeline and its capacity booking
The OPAL pipeline, which runs from Lubmin near Greifswald (the 
entry point of the Nord Stream pipeline to the German network) 
to Olbernhau on the German-Czech border, was launched in 
2011. It is 80% owned by the WIGA company (WIGA Transport 
Beteiligungs-GmbH & Co. KG – a joint undertaking of Winter-
shall and Gazprom) and 20% owned by the Lubmin-Brandov 
Gastransport GmbH company (a subsidiary of E.ON). Its capacity 
is 36.5 bcm.
Capacity booking:
- 6.4 bcm annually has been booked by E.ON (in connection 
with its 20% share in OPAL), 4.5 bcm – by the Gascade opera-
tor which makes transmission available to third parties (main-
ly under short-term contracts via PRISMA);
- half of the remaining 25.6 bcm is used by Gazprom (pursuant 
to the present exemption from TPA), and the other half has de 
facto remained unused.
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Reactions to the EC’s decision regarding the OPAL pipeline
– Germany: 
The media mainly emphasised the fact that the European Commission is forcing the German regula-
tor, BNetzA, to toughen its proposal regarding the utilisation of the OPAL pipeline. It also pointed to 
the stance adopted by Poland, which opposes granting Gazprom special privileges on the EU market. 
Although the BNetzA has not yet published any press release, it did announce its plan to launch talks 
with those companies which are directly affected by the EC’s decision (the BNetzA is obliged to im-
plement the EC’s decision within a month). The OPAL pipeline operator (OPAL Gastransport GmbH & 
Co. KG), for its part, announced in a press release that it would offer further remarks in response to 
the EC’s decision as soon as it obtains access to it1. Furthermore, it suggested that it is in the compa-
ny’s interest to find a solution enabling long-term use of OPAL’s capacity. This suggests that the EC’s 
decision does not fully meet the operator’s expectations and the company does not regard it as final. 
Rafał Bajczuk
– Austria:
The tone of Austrian media reports on the EC’s decision was different from the German one. The 
main emphasis was placed on the fact that Gazprom gained considerable concessions from the Eu-
ropean Commission. Another topic discussed in Austria was the impact of the EC’s decision on the 
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, because the Austrian company OMV is involved in it. 
The Wiener Zeitung newspaper wrote that the EC’s decision regarding OPAL is a positive sign in the 
context of investing in Nord Stream 2. It also pointed to the fact that the Polish gas company PGNiG 
opposed the EC’s decision. 
Rafał Bajczuk
– Russia: 
The reactions to the EC’s decision regarding OPAL are varied. On the one hand, press reports quote 
positive comments suggesting that the EC’s decision, which is favourable for Gazprom, is rational 
and fair in the context of the present market situation (no real interest on the part of Gazprom’s 
competitors in utilising the ‘spare’ capacity of the pipeline; an attempt by the EU to protect itself 
should there be problems with the transit of Russian gas via Ukraine due to the lower level of utili-
sation of Ukrainian gas storage tanks than before). 
On the other hand, the first public statement by a Gazprom representative, made on 1 November 
(4 days after the EC published its press release), increases the doubts as to whether the decision me-
ets the Russian company’s expectations. In a TV interview, Gazprom’s vice president, Aleksandr Me-
dvedev, said that the European Commission unilaterally made changes to the four-party agreement 
regarding the modes of the OPAL pipeline utilisation. Criticising the EC’s behaviour, he added that 
Gazprom will decide whether to accept the agreement amended by the EC after a detailed analysis 
of the document. 
Szymon Kardaś
1 OPAL Gastransport GmbH & Co. KG examines decision by the European Commission, 31 October 2016, https://www.
opal-gastransport.de/fileadmin/Press_PDF_OPAL/OPAL_PR_161031_Decision_European_Commission.pdf
APPENDIX 2
6OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 226
– Ukraine: 
On 27 October, before the EC had even announced its decision, Naftohaz issued a statement expres-
sing hope that the EC’s decision regarding the utilisation of the OPAL pipeline will not only be fully 
in line with the EU’s energy and anti-trust legislation but also that it will take account of the EU’s in-
tention to achieve energy independence. Furthermore, the company stated that one of the consequ-
ences of the possible increased utilisation by Gazprom of OPAL’s capacity would involve allowing the 
Russian company to “destroy Ukraine’s transit system as a competitor in the supply of gas to the EU 
states”. In its statement Naftohaz warned that, as a consequence of the EC’s decision, the volume 
of Russian gas transit via Ukraine will decrease considerably, as will the country’s revenue from gas 
transit. The presented calculations suggest that if Gazprom gains access to an additional 30% of 
OPAL’s capacity, then the transit of gas will be reduced by 10–11 bcm annually, and Ukraine’s revenue 
will decrease by USD 290–320 million. Should Gazprom gain access to 40% of OPAL’s capacity, this 
transit will be reduced by 13.5–14.5 bcm, and Ukraine’s revenue by USD 395–425 million.
Numerous Ukrainian politicians have expressed their concern over the EC’s decision regarding OPAL, 
emphasising that it would have a negative impact on Ukraine’s energy security. In the meantime, 
Kyiv has stepped up its plan to adopt a national programme of fuel supply diversification, particular-
ly for gas. The Supreme Council is preparing a special appeal to the parliaments of EU states and the 
EU’s executive bodies regarding the risk involved in the implementation of new gas pipeline projects 
that bypass Ukraine. 
Wojciech Konończuk
– Central Europe: 
The authorities of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary have offered no official reaction to the 
EC’s decision regarding OPAL. As far as the energy companies operating in these states are concer-
ned, only the Czech company EPH (co-owner of the Slovak transit pipeline Eustream) has presented 
its stance. The Czech company announced that taking into account the ship-or-pay clause (Gazprom 
is obliged to ship 50 billion m3 via Slovakia by 2028) and the actual distribution of gas transmission 
in Europe, it does not expect its profit to decrease as a result of the EC’s decision. 
The lack of reaction on the part of the Czech authorities to the EC’s decision seems to result from 
the fact that although Prague positively assesses the prospects of increasing gas transport via OPAL, 
it does not intend to emphasise that its interests are separate from the interests of Bratislava and 
Warsaw. Czech media, for its part, has openly discussed the issue of Czech interests in the context of 
the OPAL pipeline, claiming that the EC’s decision is favourable for the German-Canadian company 
Net4Gas (the owner and operator of the Gazelle pipeline which is an extension of the OPAL pipeline) 
and at the same time favourable for the Czech Republic, due to the expected increase in profit from 
the transport of gas via the country. 
The absence of comment offered by the authorities of Slovakia on the EC’s decision regarding OPAL 
seems to confirm the government’s waning criticism of the Nord Stream 2 project. As a country 
holding presidency of the EU Council, Slovakia prefers to play the role of a moderator in the debates 
within the EU, and a dispute with the EC over OPAL would be tantamount to a dispute with Maroš 
Šefčovič – Vice-President of the European Commission for Energy Union. The Slovak government co-
operates with Šefčovič and seems to regard the EC’s decision as a poor solution which nonetheless 
is the best of all the currently feasible solutions. Moreover, through Šefčovič it seems to be trying to 
underline its primary interest in the energy policy, i.e. to continue gas transit via Slovakia, most pre-
ferably by maintaining the transport of Russian gas via Ukraine. In the event of increased transport 
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of Russian gas via OPAL, Bratislava would likely intend to make up for the expected decrease of gas 
transport from Ukraine with increased transport of gas from the Czech Republic.
Silence on the part of Hungary with regards to the EC’s decision over OPAL is connected with the 
fact that, on the one hand, Budapest fears the construction of Nord Stream 2 and the expected 
significant reduction of gas transport via Ukraine, yet on the other hand, it does not intend to aggra-
vate its relations with Moscow. Both the government and the energy companies are satisfied with 
the present terms of gas cooperation with Russia. Budapest’s support for Visegrad Group’s political 
initiatives targeting the Nord Stream 2 project is largely determined by the intention to tighten 
Central European cooperation. It also forms part of the strategy to make plain the lack of consent 
for ‘unequal’ treatment by the European Commission for various projects (disagreement with the 
EC over the reservations regarding South Stream). It should not be expected that it will trigger any 
official decisions (e.g. appealing against the EC’s decision, arbitration with Gazprom). 
Jakub Groszkowski
